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Amartya Sen is an economist and philosopher whose work in social choice theory, development economics, and moral and political theory has been very influential. This Entry focuses on Sen’s discussion of Rawls’s views. These are summarized in Sen’s recent book The Idea of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009; hereafter “IJ”). Sen endorses several key features of Rawls’s theory of justice, including its focus on fairness, its account of objectivity, its characterization of persons as rational and reasonable, its view of liberty as a separate value, its insistence on the importance of procedural fairness in addition to the achievement of certain social and economic outcomes, its particular attention to the plight of the worst-off, and its effort to connect freedom with real opportunities (IJ, 63-4). 
However, Sen makes several criticisms. The three most important concern the metric of justice (IJ, 234-5, 253-4, 261-3), the site of justice (IJ, x-xi, 10, 18-27, 67-9, 85), and the aims and structure of theorizing about justice (IJ, 9-18, 56-7, 97-102). First, Sen argues that Rawls’s focus on social primary goods is insufficient for measuring and comparing peoples’ quality of life. Specifically, the difference principle’s focus on income and wealth faces a deficit common in “resourcist” views of justice. This is their blindness to the “conversion problem”: given personal heterogeneities, diversities in physical environment, variations in social climate, and differences in relational (cultural) perspectives, different individuals can have quite different abilities to convert income and other primary goods into valuable forms of life. So when we answer the question “Equality of what?”, referring to equality of resources will not necessarily track equal life-prospects. Sen recommends that instead of focusing on means such as primary goods, we focus on people’s “capabilities,” their real opportunities or substantive freedoms to do and be what they have reason to value. This broader focus would capture the sources of variation mentioned above. (Sen acknowledges, however, that the space of capabilities does not exhaust the metric of justice: personal liberty and procedural fairness, for example, are additional concerns, and are duly captured in the principles of Rawls’s theory that complement the difference principle (IJ, 297)).
Second, Sen claims that Rawls’s primary focus on institutions is too narrow. We should not only assess the justice of institutional arrangements and rules, but also, simultaneously, illuminate the significance of people’s real behavioral tendencies. If the ultimate normative concern is what kinds of lives people actually lead, the primary focus should be broadened to track “social realizations,” the totality of what turns out to happen in a social context.
Third, Sen thinks that Rawls takes the crucial goal of theorizing about justice to be the identification of a perfectly just society. Against such “transcendental approach” to justice, Sen defends a “comparative approach,” according to which we should aim at making comparative assessments of feasible social scenarios in order to identify reforms that involve justice-enhancement, or injustice-reduction, even if the results fall short of perfect justice. Sen claims that transcendental theorizing is infeasible (e.g. even in the original position a unique set of principles would fail to be selected). He also argues that it is redundant: it is neither sufficient, nor necessary, nor even helpful, for the real task of comparing feasible political options. As an intuition pump, Sen suggests the analogous case in which we are comparing two paintings, one by Dali and another by Picasso. To decide which is better, knowing that the Mona Lisa is the perfect painting would be of no help.
Some additional criticisms leveled by Sen against Rawls’s theory of justice are (i) that its ascription of total priority to liberty is too extreme (IJ, 65, 299); (ii) that it wrongly focuses on “closed” rather than “open impartiality,” ignoring the possibly illuminating judgments of agents who are not members of the focus group of a given social contract (IJ, 123ff.); and (iii) that it narrowly focuses on requirements of mutually beneficial cooperation or reciprocity, ignoring the existence of unidirectional “obligations of effective power” in which agents who are more powerful than others have pro tanto reason to benefit them simply because doing so is feasible and would make the world more just (regardless of considerations of mutual benefit or reciprocity) (IJ, 202-7).
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